JUDICIAL REVIEW, DELEGATION, AND PUBLIC
HEARINGS UNDER NEPA
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)1 establishes a national policy of environmental protection 2 and directs that
all federal agencies follow certain operating procedures8 intended to
effectuate that policy.4 The most important of these procedural requirements is that any agency undertaking a "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" must prepare an environmental impact statement. 5 That statement must in1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
2. This policy is set forth in section 101 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970),
which provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Congress ... declares that it is the continuing policy of the
Federal Government... to create and maintain conditions under which man
and nature can exist in productive harmony ....
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means,
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve
and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end
that the Nation may(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and
unintended consequences.
3. These procedures are outlined in section 102 of NEPA and call for all federal
agencies to, inter alia, utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach in environmental
planning, section 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970); develop methods for
giving appropriate consideration to "presently unquantified environmental amenities and
values," section 102(2) (B), id. § 4332(2) (B); and make available to state and local
governments and other organizations and individuals information and advice useful in
maintaining the quality of the environment, section 102(2) (F), id. § 4332(2) (F).
4. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). These "action-forcing" procedures are intended to help ensure that the policies enunciated in section 101 are implemented. Id.
5. This requirement is embodied in section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2) (C) (1970), which requires all federal agencies to
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,
and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has juris-
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elude, inter alia, a detailed discussion of the environmental impact of

the proposed action, the unavoidable adverse environmental impacts
which would result from the implementation of the proposal, and the
possible alternatives to the proposed action. 6 Compliance with these
and other mandates of NEPA may impose a substantial burden on
an agency, 7 a burden which will often tend to interfere with the
agency's traditional functions.8 Significantly increasing the burden imposed on federal agencies by this requirement of NEPA are the actions

of environmentalists and others opposing federal projects who have
employed the impact statement requirement as a useful legal weapon
by attacking purported agency compliance with the requirement on
a variety of grounds. Among these lines of attack have been challenges
of (1) the accuracy of an agency determination that an impact statement is not required with respect to a certain agency action, (2) the
sufficiency of impact statements which have been prepared, and (3)
the validity of an agency's decision to implement a project after the
preparation of an impact statement. Resolution of these challenges
has required the courts to attempt to balance the often competing interests of environmental protection and administrative efficiency, both
of which are recognized in the vague language of NEPA.9
Emphasizing 1973 cases, this Note will survey the present judicial

confusion as to the proper interpretation of statutory language and the
diction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact
involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop
and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President,
the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing
agency review processes.
This requirement has been referred to as the only provision in section 102 "with teeth."
Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.1., dissenting),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (1970). See the text of section 102(2)(C),
set forth in note 5 supra, for the remaining requirements regarding the content on an
environmental impact statement.
7. The preparation of impact statements can be time-consuming and expensive.
For example, the final impact statement issued in connection with the recent $15.3
million Gillham Dam project in Arkansas cost $250,000. See Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 294 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1072 (1972). See also Note, Applicability of NEPA's Impact Statement Requirement
to the EPA, 1974 DurK L.J. 353, 374 n.102, in 1973 Developments.
8. Illustrative of this fact is the statement of the General Counsel of the ICC
that the preparation of impact statements in connection with railroad abandonment proceedings interferes with the vital but elusive goal of creating a streamlined and economically viable railroad system in the Northeast. Remarks of Fritz Kahn, Meeting
of Metropolitan N.Y. Chapter of the Ass'n of ICC Practitioners, Sept. 11, 1973.
9. See NEPA section 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970), which is reprinted
in part in note 2 supra.
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proper standards of judicial review to be applied in resolving the problems which have arisen in each of the preceding areas. Following
this discussion, the Note will then examine cases which have considered the propriety of allowing agencies subject to NEPA to delegate
the preparation of the required impact statement to third parties. Finally, the recently debated role and timing of public hearings in the
agency review process will be discussed.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN AGENCY DETERMINATION THAT No IMPACT
STATEMENT IS REQUIRED FOR A PROPOSED FEDERAL ACTION

As was previously noted, the most important of NEPA's procedural requirements is section 102(2)(C)'s mandate that an environmental impact statement be prepared for all "major Federal actions
In
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."1
determining whether an impact statement is required for a given project under this statutory provision, the courts have been called upon
to perform two basic tasks. The first of these tasks has been resolution of the questions of law presented by the need to give greater
meaning to the statutory language of section 102(2) (C). The second, development of an appropriate standard of judicial review for a
given agency decision not to file an environmental impact statement,
requires a valid application of the statutory standards to the particular
facts of each case. While these tasks are functionally distinct, the statutory interpretation of section 102(2)(C) and the standard of judicial
review adopted by the courts cumulatively play a principal, if not concIusive, role in determining whether preparation of an environmental
impact statement will ultimately be required with respect to a given
federal action.
JudicialDefinition of "Significant"Effect
The agencies have somewhat narrowed the scope of the first of
these tasks, that of statutory interpretation, by generally conceding that
a proposed action is "major" if substantial time or money will be devoted to the proposed project, 1 and similarly delimited it by holding
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970). See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp.
877, 879 (D. Ore. 1971). See also Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v.
Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1972) (4.25 mile segment of six lane expressway
"major"); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1972) (court followed
agency's own guideline which states that upgrading of existing road which has potential
of significantly affecting the environment is "major" action).
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that even a proposed state or private action is "federal" if the action
involves federal funding, licensing, or other such "enablement. ' 12 On
the other hand, the meaning of the phrase "significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment," was vigorously disputed in a 1972
case where a federal agency made a determination that no environ14
mental impact statement was required.' 8 In Hanly v. Kleindienst,
12. See, e.g., National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408, 411-12
(9th Cir. 1973); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1137 n.22 (4th Cir. 1971). But see
City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 258-59 (1st Cir. 1972) ("tentative allocation"
of federal funds to state project did not constitute sufficient federal involvement to
make action "federal").
13. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the executive branch's principal advisory body on environmental protection matters, has issued guidelines in an attempt to give more concrete meaning to this particular statutory language. The guidelines provide in part:
The statutory clause "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment" is to be construed by agencies with a view
to the overall, cumulative impact of the action proposed (and of further actions contemplated). Such actions may be localized in their impact, but if
there is potential that the environment may be significantly affected, the statement is to be prepared. Proposed actions, the environmental impact of which
is likely to be highly controversial, should be covered in all cases. In considering what constitutes major action significantly affecting the environment,
agencies should bear in mind that the effect of many Federal decisions about
a project or complex of projects can be individually limited but cumulatively
considerable. CEQ Guidelines, § 5(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
This language is substantially unchanged in the current CEQ Guidelines. CEQ Guidelines, § 1500.6(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 2055 (1973). It should be noted, however, that the
CEQ Guidelines are merely advisory since the CEQ has no authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with NEPA. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn,
476 F.2d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d
412, 421 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). But see 1972 DUKE LJ. 667,
677.
Since each agency is required to establish procedures for ensuring that environmental values are considered in its major actions, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (B) (1970), the guidelines of each of the various agencies attempt to clarify the statutory language as it
applies to that agency. See, e.g., Department of Transportation Policy and Proecdure
Memorandum 90-1: Environmental Impact and Related Statements (DOT PPM 90-1),
37 Fed. Reg. 21,809 (1972); GSA Implementation Procedures, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,336
(1971). However, such agency guidelines, like those issued by the CEQ, do not have
the force of law. See Lathan v. Volpe,
F.2d
(9th Cir. 1973). See generally 1
K. DAvis § 5.03. Moreover, in a case such as that presented by NEPA, where the
applicable statute imposes burdensome duties not directly related to the primary task of
the agency and therefore outside that agency's scope of expertise, judicial deference to
agency guidelines in interpreting the statute seems inappropriate. See Note, Substantive
Review Under the National Environmental Policy Act: Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 3 EcoLoGY L.Q. 173, 186 (1973). But see Iowa Citizens for
Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 855 (8th Cir. 1973).
14. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). This case
and other earlier cases involving NEPA negative statements are discussed in Comment,
ludicial Review of a NEPA Negative Statement, 53 BOSTON U.L. Ruv. 879 (1973),
and Note, NEPA, Environmental Impact Statements and the Hanly Litigation: To
File or Not to File, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 522 (1973).
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a group of neighborhood residents and businessmen sought to enjoin
the General Services Administration (GSA) from continuing construction of a proposed federal jail in Manhattan on the ground that no
environmental impact statement had been prepared. Following the
functional analysis suggested above, the Second Circuit held that the
GSA's threshold decision that no impact statement was required involved both a question of law, the meaning of the word "significantly,"
and a question of fact, whether the particular proposed project under
consideration would have a significant adverse environmental impact. 15
In defining the term "significantly," the Hanly court held that an
agency would have to consider at least the following two factors in
making its determintion of whether a proposed action would significantly affect the quality of the environment:
(1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the area
affected by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental
effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm that results
from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area.1 6
By delineating these factors, the Second Circuit emphasized that an
agency's primary consideration in assessing the significance of the impact of a proposed action should be the relative adverse environmental
effects of the proposed project as compared to the current environmental conditions in the affected area and the absolute quality of the
environment which would result from implementation of the proposed
project. Thus under the Hanly court's standards, where the proposed
actions would conform with the existing uses, the adverse consequences of that project would be less "significant" than when it constituted a radical change,17 and it would therefore be less likely that an
environmental impact statement would be required. However, the
Hanly majority augmented this attempt to substantively define the term
"significantly" with an attempt to give greater effect to section 102(2)
(B)'s requirement that the agency "identify and develop . . . procedures . . . which [would] insure that presently unquantified environ15. 471 F.2d at 828-29.
16. Id. at 830-31.
17. Id. at 831. This reasoning has also been endorsed by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Maryland-Natl Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In that case
the court noted that in the context of land-use planning, there might be a presumption
that the environmental impact of a proposed action would not be significant if the
proposed use of the land conformed to local regulations governing land use. 487 F.2d
at 1036-37.
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values may be given appropriate consideration in decision-

making .... Is To implement this directive, the Second Circuit

held that prior to its threshold decisions, an agency should "give notice
to the public of the proposed major federal -action and an opportunity
to submit relevant facts which might bear upon the agency's threshold decision." 19 While recognizing that these provisions were not
required by any statutory or administrative provisions, the court noted
that they were necessary "to assure a fair and informed preliminary
decision. ' 20 This attempt by the Hanly majority to lend greater definition to the term "significantly" in section 102(2)(C) has been
described by at least one commentator as providing little more guidance than the vague statutory language, 2 1 and was criticized at the time
of the case by dissenting Chief Judge Friendly as resulting in too narrow a definition to adequately protect environmental values.22 Chief
Judge Friendly stated that the -proper application of section 102(2) (C)
requires a liberal interpretation of the term "significantly" rather than
the implementation of procedures unsupported by NEPA's statutory
language.28 Noting that one of the purposes of the impact statement
was to insure that the agency consider the relevant environmental data
prior to its decision to proceed with a proposed project, Judge Friendly
felt that NEPA had to be so construed as to assure that an agency
would not make its decision without a detailed study of the relevant
information. 24 Consequently, he maintained that the term "significantly" should be interpreted broadly, thereby requiring the preparation of an impact statement wherever it was "fairly arguable" that the
proposed action would have an adverse environmental impact."
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (B) (1970).
19. 471 F.2d at 836. The court stated that in many cases a public hearing might
be necessary as the best method of developing relevant information and an understanding of the proposed action, although the court felt that the decision whether or not to
hold a hearing was "better left to the agency." Id.
20. Id. at 835.
21. Note, supra note 14, at 541.
22. 471 F.2d at 838.
23. Id. at 837-38 (Friendly, CJ., dissenting). Chief Judge Friendly noted that,
in addition to being unsupported by the statutory language of NEPA, the procedural
requirements imposed by the majority amounted to a "mini-impact statement" which
might replace the more detailed impact statement in close cases while wasting time
and money in truly insignificant ones. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. In support of this "low threshold" reading of "significantly," Judge
Friendly cited Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United
States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.C.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 669 (1973),
and the CEQ Guidelines (discussed in note 13 supra). The court in SCRAP implied
that the question was one for the reviewing court to decide, requiring an impact statement "whenever the action arguably will have an adverse environmental impact," at least
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Several factors suggest that the interpretation of "significantly"
advocated by Judge Friendly more faithfully vindicates the purposes
of section 102(2)(C)'s impact statement requirement.
Since the
broad purpose which underlies NEPA is to ensure that federal agencies will include environmental considerations in their decision-making
processes, there should be a presumption in favor of impact statements
in order to effectuate the policy of the Act. 6 Such a presumption
is created and the purpose of the Act is effectuated by a broad definition of the term "significantly" which establishes a low threshold for
impact statement preparation and thus encourages agencies to prepare
impact statements in doubtful cases. Judge Friendly's definition of
a "significant" federal action as one which "arguably" may have an
adverse environmental impact represents such a broad definition. On
the other hand, the two "objective" criteria created by the majority
would require the preparation of an impact statement only if a certain
level of absolute and incremental adverse environmental impact was
anticipated as a result of the proposed agency action. 7 Furthermore,
28
the necessarily vague language used in describing these factors
makes it doubtful that they will contribute much more greatly than
the standard suggested by Judge Friendly to the predictability and
certainty of agency threshold decisions. Finally, the procedural requirements imposed by the Hanly majority have, as noted above,29 no
where the record does not reveal a detailed study by the agency. 346 F. Supp. at 201
(emphasis in original).
The Hanly majority agreed with Judge Friendly that an impact statement should
be required in doubtful cases, but was skeptical as to whether his approach would be
of practical assistance in achieving this objejctive: "Mhe problem . . . cannot be
solved by an interchange of adjectives. In our view such a morass can be avoided
only by formulation of more precise factors that must be considered in making the
essential threshold determination." 471 F.2d at 831.
However, the majority and dissent would disagree as to where the threshold should
be set, i.e., whether a given case was "doubtful" or not, as was evidenced by their conflicting resolution of the case before them. The majority indicated that the agency's
decision not to prepare an impact statement would have survived an arbitrary and capricious test of judicial review had it not been for inadequate investigation of certain
problems by the agency; whereas Judge Friendly concluded that an impact statement
should be prepared. See id. at 835, 839.
26. Cf. Maryland-Natl Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal
Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (low threshold for impact statements);
SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 199 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
27. But see Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 908 (1973), where the Hanly majority argued that the combination of its
"objective" criteria and procedural requirements would themselves encourage impact
statement preparation.
28. See notes 16, 21 supra and accompanying text.
29. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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express statutory foundation and seem of doubtful utility in encouraging impact statement preparation. Merely requiring that an agency
give the public notice of its impending decision regarding the necessity
vel non of an impact statement and that the agency accept any information offered will do little if anything to assure that the information
received
will actually be relied upon by the agency in making its deci0
sion.3
JudicialReview of the Negative Determination
Resolution of the second threshold task presented by NEPA's impact statement requirement-that of determining the appropriate
standard of judicial review to be applied to an agency's decision not
to file an environmental impact statement-has produced conflicting
results."1 Representative of the contrasting standards are the Second
Circuit's decision in Hanly and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Save Our
32

Ten Acres v. Kreger.
In Hanly, the Second Circuit held that an agency's determination
as to whether a project would have a "'significantly' adverse environmental impact" is a question of fact, which is subject to the general
review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.83 Conse30. See Note, supra note 14, at 547.
31. See, e.g., Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.W. Va. 1972) (de novo review); SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (de novo review); Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (de novo review); Scherr v. Volpe, 336
F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971), aft'd, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972) (de novo review); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972) (rational
basis test); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore.
1971) (arbitrary and capricious standard).
32. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973), noted in 7 GA. L. REv. 785 (1973).
33. The court felt this standard of review was in accord with the Supreme Court's
decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), discussed in note 94 infra. The court thereby rejected application of a so-called rational
basis or reasonable basis standard of judicial review, see notes 36-41 infra and accompanying text. This test is generally applied in cases where an agency exercises rulemaking authority to construe a statutory term. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941). In Hearst, the Supreme
Court helped to define this standard when it accepted the NLRB's decision that the term
"employees" covered newsboys, by stating that review in such a case was limited to deciding if the agency's determination had a reasonable basis in law and warrant in the
record. 322 U.S. at 131. While the Hanly court recognized that the "rational basis"
test was available for mixed questions of law and fact, the court believed it inappropriate in a case such as Hanly where it found that the legal and factual questions could
be isolated. 471 F.2d at 829. But see Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F.
Supp. 783, 789 (D. Me. 1972) (rational basis test applied).
The Supreme Court does not always apply the deferential rational basis standard
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quently, the court stated that an agency's negative determination was
to be set aside if the agency's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law" or
if ,the agency failed to adhere to the necessary procedural requirements.3 4 Under this standard of review, an agency's decision, which

is otherwise in accordance with the applicable law, would be held invalid only if the reviewing court found that the agency had made a

"clear error of judgment."35 Thus, the Hanly court felt that a narrow
standard of judicial review should be applied to an agency's threshold

determination that an impact statement was not required.
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, in Save Oar Ten Acres v.
Kreger3" (SOTA), rejected the -arbitrary and capricious standard.

Noting that the threshold decision as to the need for an impact statement "must be subject to inspection under a more searching standard,"
the Fifth Circuit held that the agency's decision should have been re-

viewed under a rule of reasonableness testy7

Under this test, in-

of review to cases involving -the application of legal concepts to the facts; in some cases
it applies a broader "rightness" test. See 4 K. DAvis, §§ 30.07, 30.13.
34. 471 F.2d at 828, citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). While Judge Friendly apparently accepted the majority's adoption of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, he was suspicious of giving too much discretion to agencies, upon which NEPA
places a duty to make impact statements, thus implying that a broader standard of review might be wisest. Id. at 838 (Friendly, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, one possible
reading of his opinion would be that he did advocate a different standard of review
in his espousal of a definition of significant as "arguably significant."
Other cases have, like Hanly, adopted the arbitrary and capricious test to govern
judicial review of an agency's decision not to file an impact statement with respect
to a proposed agency action. See, e.g., Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. v. AEC,
482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3502 (U.S. Jan. 29,
1974) (No. 73-1315) (the dissent felt that an impact statement was needed and
objected to what it felt to be the majority's use of a less strict "rational basis"
test rather than the Hanly arbitrary and capricious test); Citizens for Clean Air,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs. 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Durnford v. Ruckelshaus,
5 Environmental Rep. Cas. 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344
(D. Conn. 1972).
35. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
36. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
37. Id. at 466. In a somewhat misleading use of terms, the SOTA opinion describes this standard as a "more relaxed" standard of judicial review. Id. at 465. It
is clear from the context of the opinion, however, that when compared to the arbitrary
and capricious test, the "rule of reasonableness" test is only more relaxed in the sense
that it requires a lesser finding by the judiciary to justify reversal of agency action.
This interpretation is clearly implied by the court's explanation of its -reasons for imposing the rule of reasonableness standard:
The spirit of the Act would die aborning if a facile, ex parte decision that
the project was minor or did not significantly affect the environment were
too well shielded from impartial review. Every such decision pretermits
all consideration of that which Congress has directed be considered "to the
fullest extent possible." Id. at 466.
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stead of only overturning an agency's negative determination if it were
shown to be arbitrary and capricious, a court would weigh the evidence
presented by the agency with that produced by any opposing parties
to determine if the agency had "reasonably concluded" that the proposed project would have no significant adverse environmental impact. 8 More importantly, as formulated by the Fifth Circuit, the rule
of reasonableness standard would allow the reviewing court to consider
evidence outside the administrative record, if it were shown that the
agency had failed to develop an adequate evidentiary basis for its deci-

sion. 9 If upon review of all the evidence, the court found that the
proposed project would have a significant adverse effect on the environment, the agency would be required to prepare an impact statement.40 Thus, in contrast to the relatively narrow standard advocated
by the Second Circuit in Hanly, the Fifth Circuit in SOTA adopted
a standard which approaches that of de novo review, whereby the reviewing court makes its own independent de novo determination of
the necessity of an agency's preparing an impact statement.4"
38. Id. at 467. The court considered this "reasonableness" test to be another way
of describing the "scope of authority" standard of review laid down by the Supreme
Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16
(1971). See 472 F.2d at 466. Under that standard, the court must determine the
range of choices allowed the agency by the statute concerned, then determine if the
agency's choice can reasonably be said to be within that range. 401 U.S. at 415-16.
In a later case, involving a 272-unit public housing project, the Fifth Circuit again
applied this "reasonableness" test, but found the agency's determination correct as a
matter of law. A full trial on the issue had been held and, on that record, the court
found that "it was not unreasonable for HUD to determine that an environmental impact statement was not required." Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d
421, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. 472 F.2d at 467.
40. Id.
41. The more deferential Hanly standard of review was also rejected by the Tenth
Circuit in Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir.
1973). In rejecting the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Tenth Circuit noted that
it properly applies only to matters within the discretion of an agency, where "NEPA's
specific requirements in § 102 clearly speak in mandatory terms, and do not leave the
determination to administrative discretion." Id. at 1249. However, the Tenth Circuit
did not explicitly adopt the broad standard of review presented in SOTA. Rather, the
Tenth Circuit maintained only that the agency decision be "reasonable" so as to be
"in accordance with the law." Id. at 1248.
mhe compass of the judgment to be made [by the agency] is narrow
. . .under the specific terms of NEPA we feel that the proper standard
• . .iswhether the negative determination was reasonable in the light of
mandatory requirements and high standards set by the statute so as to be
"inaccordance with law'--another ground of review in § 706(2) (A) which
may be applied consistently with the procedural demands of NEPA (footnote omitted). Id. at 1249.
While the Tenth Circuit in Wyoming Outdoor thus joined the Fifth Circuit in rejecting the arbitrary and capricious standard as too deferential a standard for judging
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A number of policy considerations provide substantial support for
adherence to the more rigorous reasonable basis standard of judicial
review adopted by the Fifth Circuit in SOTA and for its application
in a manner approaching that of de novo judicial review. Like Judge
Friendly's broader definition of the term "significantly" under section
102(2)(C), application of a more rigorous standard of judicial review
promotes the broad purposes of NEPA by encouraging agencies to file
impact statements in doubtful cases. 42 Furthermore, if the allocation
of determinations between agency and court should depend on the
"comparative qualifications of the agency and of the courts to decide
the particular issue," as Professor Davis asserts, 43 then the question
of what is a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment" within the intent of NEPA is arguably
a question for the courts, experts in synthesizing the conflicting goals
of society, rather than for the agencies, whose expertise lies in much
narrower fields. 44 This argument is made even more compelling
when one considers the contention that the very newness and vagueness of the statutory terms of section 102(2) (C) arguably transforms
the initial agency decisions construing them into inextricably related
questions of law and fact more appropriately determined by a court
than an agency.45 Finally, applying this more rigorous standard in
such a manner as to -approach a process of de novo review represents
a more effective means of overcoming the potential administrative bias
against the preparation and filing of impact statements on the part of
development-minded agencies. 46
the validity of an agency's negative determination under section 102(2)(C), there is
no indication that it shared the Fifth Circuit's view that the reviewing court should
look outside the administrative record to determine whether the applicable standard of
review had been met by the agency whose decision was under scrutiny. In this sense,
then, the Tenth Circuit's position would seem to be an intermediate one, when compared to that of the Second Circuit in Hanly, on the one hand, and that of the Fifth
Circuit in SOTA, on the other.
42. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
43. 4 K. DAvis § 30.09.
44. See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of
Administrative Law, 70 COLum. L. Ray. 612, 629 (1970); Note, supra note 14, at 539.
45. See Sive, supra note 44, at 625-26.
46. See L. JAFFE 621. The compliance of federal agencies with NEPA has often
been grudging. See Dinwoodey, New Factors in Agency Decision-Making, 6 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 498, 517 (1972); COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPROvENENTS NEEDED IN FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE NATIONAL ENviRONMENTAL

POLICY Acr OF 1969, at 13-20 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v.
AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
One district court has observed that negative determinations had been routinely
used by the ICC as a "ruse" for avoiding the requirements of NEPA. SCRAP v.
United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 200-01 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S.
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As compelling as are these factors supporting the standard of judicial review adopted by the Fifth Circuit in SOTA, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the utilization of the more deferential arbitrary and
capricious standard by the Second Circuit in Hanly rests on a substantially sounder analysis of case precedent and statutory authority and
that, especially if that standard were combined with a broad definition
of "significant" impact as was advocated by Judge Friendly, it would
seem to balance more satisfactorily the competing objectives of the
various federal agencies and NEPA's objective of environmental protection.

Since NEPA directs that the "agencies . . . shall" perform

the procedures prescribed by section 102(2) ,4 it would seem inaccurate to assume, as did the Fifth Circuit, that the threshold decision to
prepare an impact statement should 'be placed in the hands of a reviewing court.48 Moreover, since agencies are already required to
substantiate a negative determination with a statement of reasons why
they believe an impact statement to be unnecessary, 49 there is little
reason to allow reviewing courts to consider evidence outside the scope
of the administrative record, as does the standard of de novo review
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in SOTA. ° Finally, such a standard en669 (1973). The General Counsel of the ICC had a more innocent explanation, but
did not deny an inclination not to file:
I must confess.., that I, for one, did not think that NEPA reasonably
could be said to apply to regulatory agencies such as the Commission and
counseled that none of its determinations properly could be deemed to be major actions significantly affected [sic] the quality of the human environment.
Remarks of Fritz Kahn, supra note 8, at 4.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970) (emphasis added).
48. Although the SOTA court indicated that it was applying a standard of reasonableness test to the agency's determination not to issue an environmental impact statement, language in the opinion suggests that the court viewed that test as permitting the
court itself to perform that function:
If the court concludes that no environmental factor would be significantly degraded by the project, GSA's determination not to file the impact statement
should be upheld. On the other hand, if the court finds that the project may
cause a significant degradation of some human environmental factors (even
though other environmental factors are affected beneficially or not at all),
the court should require the filing of an impact statement or grant SOTA such
other equitable relief as it deems appropriate. 472 F.2d at 467 (emphasis
added).
49. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See also Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir.), cert. denied., 409 U.S. 990
(1972); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138-39 (4th Cir. 1971).
50. The SOTA court clearly indicates that the judicial review of an agency's decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement is not limited to the administrative record. The court notes that
the court should proceed to examine and weigh the evidence of both the plaintiff and the agency to determine whether the agency reasonably concluded
that the particular project would have no effects which would significantly
degrade our environmental quality. This inquiry must not necessarily be limited to consideration of the administrative record, but supplemental affidavits,
depositions and other proof concerning the environmental impact of the pro-
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courages those opposed to an agency's actions to challenge in the

courts every agency's decision on the grounds of an "inadequate evidentiary development" and would thus unduly burden those agencies

which have complied fully with the procedural and evidentiary requirements of NEPA.5 1
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF IMPACT STATEMENTS

After an agency has prepared an impact statement in connection
with a proposed action, the adequacy of that statement may then be
subjected to judicial scrutiny. As noted by one court, "the mere filing
of a document labelled 'final impact statement' is insufficient to shield
an agency from judicial review if the document fails to comply with
the standards outlined in NEPA."' 2 Thus, to prepare an adequate
statement, an agency must comply with section 102(2)(C)'s five-fold
requirement of "detailed statement" on: the environmental impact of
the proposed action; the unavoidable adverse environmental effects
which would result from the implementation of the project; the alternatives to the proposed project; the irretrievable and irreversible
commitment of resources entailed in the project; and the relationship
between the short-term use of the environment and the enhancement

of long-term productivity."

Initial court decisions held the agencies

to a strict standard of compliance with the procedural requirements

of section 102. 5" Consequently, under these decisions, compliance
ject may be considered if an adequate evidentiary development before the
agency can be shown. 472 F.2d at 467.
Such broad scope of review appears inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Camp v. Pitts, 93 S.Ct. 1241 (1973) (per curiam), wherein the Court held that
in reviewing informal agency decisions the court must confine its review to the administrative record, "not some new record made initially in the reviewing court." Id. at 1244.
Although the Court stated that if the basis for the administrative decision is inadequately
explained, the court may seek "additional explanation of the reasons for the agency
decision as may prove necessary" id.; it clearly rejected the contention that parties
dissatisfied with informal agency decisions may introduce evidence before the court
which supports their position. Id.
51. It should be noted that some agencies have not been reluctant to prepare impact statements. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA m THE COURTS 84-85 (1973). Moreover,
where agency rules require impact statements, the courts will demand agency compliance therewith. See Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d
693 (2d Cir. 1972); Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971).
Another factor which may be asserted in support of a narrower scope of judicial
review is an agency's need to make its decision with some feeling of certainty that
its decision will be upheld. Compare Comment, supra note 14, at 894-98, with Goose
Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 880 (D. Ore. 1971).
52. SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 195 n.8 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
53. For text of section 102(2) (C); see note 5 supra.
54. See, e.g., Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coor-
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with that standard required detailed discussions of all known possible
environmental consequences" and a wide range of alternatives to the
proposed action.56 As the frequent impossibility of an agency's complying with such strict requirements became more evident,r 7 however,
courts began to manifest a more lenient attitude.58 Thus, more recent
cases generally reflect a realization by the judiciary that substantial
dinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Daly v. Volpe, 350
F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
The courts have continued to interpret the language in section 102 that the agencies shall "to the fullest extent possible" perform the tasks contained in section 102(2)
as requiring full compliance unless there is a clear conflict of statutory authority.
Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). This view is supported by
the legislative history of NEPA. The Conference Committee report explained this
phrase as follows:
The purpose of the new language is to make it clear that each agency of the
Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in such subparagraphs (A) through (H) unless the existing law applicable to such agency's
operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible .

. .

. Thus, it is the intent of the conferees that the provi-

sion "to the fullest extent possible" shall not be used by any Federal agency
as a means of avoiding compliance with the directives set out in section 102.
CoNF. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1969).
55. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749,
759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
56. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (requiring discussion of all possible alternatives that would alter environmental impact and the cost-benefit balance).
Even alternatives beyond the power of the agency to implement must be included.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Moreover, the CEQ Guidelines specifically require the discussion of alternatives not
within the existing authority of the agency. CEQ Guidelines § 1500.8(a)(4), 38 Fed.
Reg. 20,554 (1973). Such an interpretation of the requirement no doubt advances the
informational purpose of impact statements. However, in a dissenting opinion to the
Natural Resources case, supra, Judge MacKinnon stated: "I just do not consider that
the law requires, or that reason dictates, the discussion of unrealistic alternatives or
their environmental impact." 458 F.2d at 846.
Contrast the view taken in a more recent case where the court indicated that alternatives beyond the power of the agency need not be considered. See Life of the Land
v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3595 (U.S.
Apr. 23, 1974).
57. See note 85 infra.
58. The change in judicial attitude may also be attributable to a change in the
attitude of the agencies: the strongest judicial statements may be seen as responses
to early, perfunctory agency attempts to comply with NEPA. In one case arguably
applying a more relaxed test of impact statement sufficiency than that laid down in
an earlier case involving the same project, the court contrasted the twelve-page statement originally issued with the "voluminous" report costing approximately a quarter
of a million dollars that the agency thereafter submitted. Compare Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 470
F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972), with Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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compliance with section 102(2) (C)'s impact statement requirement
is sufficient, even in eases where preparation of a more comprehensive

and detailed impact statement would be possible. 9 This approach implicitly recognizes that the environmental goals served by the impact
statement must be balanced against the limited resources and competing goals of society, and that at some point a "better" impact statement
does not merit the additional burden on an agency's manpower and

budget which its preparation would entail.
Three decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit illustrate the

courts' transition from requiring strict compliance with section 102 to
recognizing that the requirements of that section should be applied

in a more tempered fashion. In the 1971 decision of Calvert Cliffs'
CoordinatingCommittee, Inc. v. AEC,60 the court noted that not only
were section 102 duties "not inherently flexible" but that "[c]onsid-

erations of administrative difficulty, delay, or economic cost will not
suffice to strip the section of its fundamental importance." 61 Less than

six months later, the District of Columbia Circuit loosened its standard
of compliance in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton62 by

introducing a "rule of reason" test for the sufficiency of an environmental impact statement.6 3 Recognizing that the discussion of environmental effects of a proposed project need not be "exhaustive," the

court held that section 102 required only sufficient discussion "to permit a reasoned choice of alternatives. ' 64 Moreover, in contrast to its
statement in Calvert Cliffs, the court noted that proper implementation of section 102 required recognition of the fact "that the resources
of energy and research-and time-available to meet the nation's
needs are not infinite."6 5 In the 1973 opinion of Scientists' Institute
59. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th
Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973); Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W.
3584 (U.S. Apr. 15, 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussion of impact of alternatives
subject to a rule of reason and need only provide information sufficient to permit a
reasoned choice).
60. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
61. Id. at 1115.
62. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
63. Id. at 834.
64. Id. at 836. While the "rule of reason" was initially introduced by the court
with reference to the required discussion of alternatives, that standard may also be applied to the other areas of the impact statement.
See National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1002 (10th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1974) (No. 73-1120); Scientists'
Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
ANDERSON, supra note 51, at 201.
65. 458 F.2d at 837. The rationale behind the court's use of the "rule of reason"
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for Public Information v. AEC,66 the court explicitly recognized that

NEPA provides a degree of flexibility and agency discretion as to the
contents of the impact statement. 67 More importantly, however, the
court elaborated on the type of compliance required of agencies under
its rule of reason standard.

While noting that the standard was sub-

ject to section 102's mandate that the procedural requirements be followed "to the fullest extent possible," the court asserted that there
would 'be adequate compliance with section 102(2) (C) if the agency

made a "good faith" effort to present the information required by that
68
section.

Thus, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit has retreated from its standard of strict compliance
presented in Calvert Cliffs. However, in adopting language of "good

faith" compliance in the Scientists' Institute case, it may be argued
that the District of Columbia Circuit retreated too far. The policy
considerations of competing social goals and administrative efficiency

which justified abandoning the requirement of strict procedural compliance for a reasonableness test of impact statement sufficiency would
seem to provide little support for taking the additional step of abandoning any type of objective test for a subjective test such as that

embodied in a rule of reason standard which is met by a mere showing of "good faith." While this language in Scientists' Institute and
the other cases in which it has appeared may represent mere dictum,"0
standard is depicted in the following statement from the court's opinion:
Mere administrative difficulty does not interpose such flexibility into the requirements of NEPA as to undercut the duty of compliance "to the fullest
extent possible." But if this requirement is not rubber, neither is it iron.
The statute must be construed in the light of reason if it is not to demand
what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible. .

.

. Id.

66. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
67. It is now clear that an agency's duties to issue a statement on a project and to consider environmental factors at each stage of agency decision
making as to that project are not inherently flexible or discretionary. But
we have also recognized that the statute admits of some discretion in determining the contents of impact statements. Id. at 1091.
68. Id. at 1092. In Scientists' Institute, the Atomic Energy Commission sought
to avoid issuing an "environmental survey" which it had previously prepared as an impact statement. Although the Commission was not attempting to circumvent NEPA,
it apparently felt that section 10's requirements were so strict that its "survey" would
fail to meet the applicable standards. Because the court's holding was simply that an
impact statement was required for the proposed project, its discussion of the requirements of section 102 and the rule of reason constituted dictum. See id. at 1091-92.
The case nonetheless illustrates a significant fact: that agencies sometimes decide
not to file an impact statement in cases of debatable significance, rather than prepare
one to be subjected to an unreasonably exacting review for sufficiency which might
entail more than one round of litigation and rewriting. See id. at 1091.
69. As was noted previously, the court's discussion in Scientists' Institute concerning the appropriate standard of review for the adequacy of an impact statement consti-
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if such language were seized by a future court and elevated to the
status of an affirmative standard, the seemingly inevitable result would
be to undermine NEPA's 'basic goal of environmental protection by
placing in the hands of those whose actions the requirement of an impact statement was intended to circumscribe the definition of the standard by which their conduct would be judged.70
While some version of the rule of reason standard has been
adopted in other recent cases, 71 two circuits have advocated standards
tuted dictum. See note 68 supra. Nevertheless, in National Helium Corp. v. Morton,
486 F.2d 995 (loth Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S. Jan.
17, 1974) (No. 73-1120), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the court's
language in Scientists' Institute when defining the "rule of reason" standard. Thus,
the Tenth Circuit held that the review of an impact statement was limited to the following determinations: (1) whether the impact statement includes a discussion of each
of the five procedural requirements of NEPA; (2) whether the impact statement "constitutes an objective good faith compliance with the demands of NEPA"; and (3)
whether the statement includes a "reasonable discussion of the subject matter involved
in the five required areas." Id. at 1002-03. Consequently, while the Tenth Circuit's
standard included a requirement of "good faith compliance," the mandate that the impact statement contain a "reasonable discussion of the subject matter" could well recognize the need of that statement to provide a basis upon which one could make a reasoned decision. See id. at 1002.
70. Application of the "good faith" standard as opposed to a more objective criterion would provide too much leeway for even those agencies whose failure to abide
by NEPA's requirements was only the result of a misapprehension as to the applicability of that statute. See Remarks of Fritz Kahn, supra note 8. Where such an
agency did attempt to comply with NEPA through the issuance of an impact statement,
that agency might in "good faith" tend to emphasize the budgetary aspects or the projected results of the proposed action rather than its potential environmental consequences. Although such an impact statement might well have been issued in good
faith, it is probable that it would fail either to alert interested parties of possible environmental effects of the project or to serve as a basis for decision-making as to the
merits of proceeding with the project. See notes 72-76 infra and accompanying text.
71. Two recent decisions by the Tenth Circuit have also endorsed the application
of the rule of reason. In Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870
(10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3584 (U.S. Apr. 15, 1974), the court
rejected an attack on the sufficiency of the discussion of alternatives contained
in an impact statement prepared in connection with a proposed highway bypass, on the ground that "[t]he discussion of the environmental effects of alternatives
in the EIS in this case are [sic] sufficient to allow a reasoned choice." Id. at 873.
Thus, as formulated in Citizens Environmental Council, the court clearly adopted the
objective criterion which was initially introduced in Natural Resources. See notes 6265 supra and accompanying text. In its subsequent decision of National Helium Corp.
v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3423
(U.S. Jan. 17, 1974) (No. 73-1120), the Tenth Circuit again endorsed the rule of
reason standard. However, in defining that standard, the court required an "objective
good faith compliance with the demands of NEPA," thereby endorsing the subjective
standard presented in Scientists' Institute. Id. at 1002.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also appears to have adopted a standard essentially equivalent to Scientists' Institute's good faith requirement. In Lathan v.
Volpe, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1973), the Ninth Circuit held that the adequacy of an
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which are possibly distinguishable from a rule of reason test but which
seem open to substantial criticism. In Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe7 2 the Eighth Circuit initially appeared to follow
Natural Resources by citing that case for the proposition that the impact statement's discussion of environmental effects "need only provide
sufficient information for a 'reasoned choice of alternatives.' ,,78 After further discussion of the case, however, the Eighth Circuit then
concluded, as if it were reiterating the same standard through the use
of interchangeable wording, that section 102 required only that the
impact statement contain a "notice of the environmental consequences" of the proposed action. 74 In utilizing this notice of consequences language, the Eighth Circuit stated that the purpose of the
impact statement is to "alert the public, other interested governmental
agencies, the Council on Environmental Quality, the President, and
the Congress of possible environmental consequences of the proposed
agency action. 7' 5 Such a notice of consequences standard, however,
is inadequate in that it recognizes only one of the important functions
of the impact statement. In addition to alerting interested parties to
the environmental consequences of a proposed action, the information
in an impact statement must be sufficient to allow decision makers
to make an informed choice as to whether to proceed with the proposed action and, if so, in what manner.7 Such a choice requires not
impact statement was a procedural question which was to be reviewed in accordance
with section 706(2)(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act. Under that section, an
agency's action is to be set aside if it was "without observance of procedure required
by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (D) (1970). In describing the implications of that standard, the Ninth Circuit held that courts should "require firm, fair, bona fide compliance
with NEPA." - F.2d at -.
Thus, like the court in Scientists' Institute, the Ninth
Circuit appeared to be requiring merely "good faith" compliance with NEPA. Only a
month before, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th
Cir. 1973), the court had adopted the arbitrary and capricious test.
72. 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 852.
74. Id. at 849.
75. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440, 444 (W.D. Wis. 1972), a!f'd, 486
F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973). The district court opinion was cited by the court in Iowa
Citizens. 487 F.2d at 852.
76. As noted by the District of Columbia Circuit in Scientists' Institute
[the] procedural requirements [of NEPAl are not dispensable technicalities, but are crucial if the statement is to serve its dual functions of informing
Congress, the President, other concerned agencies and the public of the environmental effects of agency action, and of ensuring meaningful consideration
of environmental factors at all stages of agency decision making. 481 F.2d
at 1091.
Similarly, as noted by a district court, the impact "statement must be sufficiently detailed to allow a responsible executive to arrive at a reasonably accurate decision regarding the environmental benefits and detriments to be expected from the program
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only information regarding the environmental impact of the proposed

action, but also some knowledge of the benefits to be obtained from
that action, the resource commitments which the proposed action would

entail, and other factors either stated in or inferrable from the language of section 102 of NEPA.

Therefore, the "notice of conse-

quences" test would seem to be at best only a partial standard for
the judicial review of the adequacy of an impact statement.
In Silva v. Lynn,7 7 the First Circuit made references to a broader

standard of review than that of the rule of reason.

Rather than

limiting the scope of review to a determination of whether the agency

complied with NEPA's procedural requirements, the First Circuit indicated that a reviewing court's inquiry might also extend to a determination of whether the agency's "findings and conclusions . . . are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law."178 The application of arbitrary and capricious as a

review standard for the sufficiency of impact statements has been considered and expressly rejected by two circuits. Thus in National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 9 the Tenth Circuit held that the arbitrary and
capricious test was the wrong standard of review for NEPA's "statutory
procedural requirements" since that standard applies to agency action

while NEPA requirements are merely prerequisites to agency action.8"
Similarly, in Lathan v. Volpe,"1 the Ninth Circuit rejected the use of
the arbitrary and capricious test on the grounds that the adequacy
of an impact statement is a procedural question, governed by the pro-

cedural test of section 706(2)(D) of the Administrative Procedure
Act.8 2
implementation." Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 140304 (D.D.C. 1971). For additional support for the dual function of an impact statement, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211,
1217 (E.D. Ark. 1972). See also National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995,
1002 (10th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1974)
(No. 73-1120).
77. 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973).
78. Id. at 1283. The court's opinion does not clearly reveal whether it actually
applied the "arbitrary and capricious" test in its determination of the adequacy of the
impact statement there in question. See id. 1283-85.
79. 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S.
Jan. 17, 1974) (No. 73-1120).
80. Id. at 1001. The Tenth Circuit did note, however, that had the agency
failed altogether to comply with the procedures of NEPA, then the "arbitrary and capricious test might well apply." Id. at 1002.
81. - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1973).
82. Id. at -.
For a more detailed discussion of Lathan, see note 71 supra.
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While it has been held that NEPA is an "environmental full disclosure law"8 3 which requires compliance with its procedures "to the
fullest extent possible," 84 a review of recent decisions indicates that
these requirements are increasingly being applied according to a rule

of reason. And although the courts have been careless in their articulation of the proper standards to be employed in the review of the
adequacy of impact statements, the decisions do at least reveal a growing judicial awareness that, due to economic and time constraints faced
by the agencies, the most complete statement possible is not required 8 "
Thus, to the extent that these decisions reveal an implicit
balancing of environmental protection against other policies in judging
the sufficiency of impact statements they appear consistent with the
basic thrust of NEPA which establishes environmental protection as
an important, but not exclusive national policy. 86
S BSTANTIVE REViEW UNDER NEPA

Assuming the preparation of an adequate impact statement, the
question arises as to whether an agency's decision to proceed with a
project can be attacked on its merits under section 101 of NEPA. 87
While the answer to this question was at first unclear, with some courts
83. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 789
(E.D. Ark. 1971); accord, Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806
(R.D. Tenn.), a!fd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Conservation Council v. Froehlke,
340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972), remanded, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam).
84. A literal interpretation of this phrase in connection with the sufficiency of impact statements could prevent any agency action since more information is always "possible" in the sense that it can be gathered. One court has explained:
[n reviewing the sufficiency of an agency's compliance with § 102, we do
not fathom the phrase 'to the fullest extent possible' to be an absolute term
requiring perfection. If perfection were the standard, compliance would necessitate the accumulation of the sum total of scientific knowledge of the environmental elements affected by a proposal. It is unreasonable to impute
to the Congress such an edict ...
mhe phrase 'to the fullest extent possible' clearly imposes a standard of environmental management requiring nothing less than comprehensive and objective treatment by the responsible agency
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp.
916, 927 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
85. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972). The
district court there stated: "It is doubtful that any agency, however objective, however
sincere, however well-staffed, and however well-financed, could come up with a perfect
environmental impact statement in connection with any major project." 342 F. Supp.
at 1217. See also Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 277 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). For text of this provision see note 2 supra.
87. Plaintiffs often challenge the sufficiency of an impact statement and attack the
agency decision on the merits in the same action. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke,
486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs,
470 F.2d 289, 292-93 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972).
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saying there could be no review of agency decisions on the merits,""
the courts increasingly have recognized the propriety of judicial review
of the agency's substantive decision. 89 The courts thus appear to be
abandoning the view that NEPA is only a "full disclosure" law encompassing only the procedural duties embodied in section 102,91 and accepting the view that "NEPA was also intended to effect substantive
changes in decisionmaking." 91
The first case which unequivocally held that an agency has substantive duties under section 101 was Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (EDF v. Corps),92 a 1972 decision by the
Eighth Circuit. In that case the court stated that the language of both
sections 101(b) and 102(1) creates an agency obligation to carry out
the substantive requirements of the Act. 9 3 Having found a substantive
88. See, e.g., Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971),
vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
V. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). For other cases in accord
see Note, Judicial Review: NEPA and the Courts, 1973 DuKr LJ. 301, 305 n.20, in
1972 Developments.
89. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289,
298 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972); Conservation Council v. Froehlke,
473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440
(S.D. Tex. 1973).
90. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
91. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972).
92. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972). The court's conclusion that section 101 creates substantive duties is supported by commentators and
the legislative history of the Act. See Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recognition of the
Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C.
IN. & COM. L. Rlv. 685, 692-94 (1972); Note, supranote 88, at 314.
Senator Jackson, sponsor of NEPA, explained that section 102 authorizes and directs
federal agencies to administer existing laws, regulations, and policies in compliance
with the policies set forth in the Act. 115 CONG. REc. 40,416 (1969) (remarks of
Senator Jackson). Thus the policies set out in section 101 impose limits on federal
agencies, rather than being merely a general statement of purpose.
For a more detailed examination of the EDF v. Corps case, see Note, supra note
88, at 301, 304-12; Note, supra note 13, at 173-74.
93. 470 F.2d at 297-98. Section 101(b) of the Act states that
it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national
policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may...
achieve six specified environmental goals. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970). See note 2
supra. Section 102(1) directs that, to the fullest extent possible, "the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1970).
The "policies" of the Act are those set forth in section 101. Id. § 4331; 470 F.2d
at 297.
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duty under the Act, the Eighth Circuit adopted as the appropriate
standard of judicial review the two primary steps of the three-tier
standard of review of informal agency action announced by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.A
Summarizing the Supreme Court's standard, the Eighth Circuit held
that "[t]he reviewing court must first determine whether the agency
acted within the scope of its authority, and next whether the decision
reached was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." 95 The Eighth Circuit then elaborated
94. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In the Overton Park case a number of individuals and
public conservation groups challenged the validity of a decision of the Secretary of
Transportation to authorize the spending of federal funds for the construction of a sixlane interstate highway through a public park in Memphis, Tennessee. Because the
genesis of the case pre-dated the passage of NEPA, the petitioners based their claim
on provisions of two other federal statutes-section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970), and section 138 of the Federal
Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970). Just as NEPA leaves to the agency
head, upon the filing of a sufficient environmental impact statement, the initial discretion to determine whether a project should be undertaken, these two statutes at issue
in the Overton Park case vest in the Secretary of Transportation the authority to appropriate federal funds to finance the construction of highways. Unlike NEPA, however,
sections 4(f) and 138 place a clearly defined limit on the Secretary's authority-he
may not, under these provisions, authorize the use of federal funds to finance the construction of highways through public parks "if a 'feasible and prudent' alternative route
exists. If no such route is available, the statutes allow him to approve construction
through parks only if there has been 'all possible planning to minimize harm' to the
park." 401 U.S. at 405 (citations omitted). The Overton Park petitioners claimed,
inter alia, that the Secretary's authorization of funds for the highway violated these
statutory provisions because "feasible and prudent" alternative routes existed for the
highway and because the Secretary's plan did not incorporate all possible means, such
as the use of tunneling and drainage techniques, to minimize the damage to the park.
After holding applicable the review provisions of section 10(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1970), and specifically ruling out the application of the subsection invoking
the substantial evidence test, id. § 706(2)(E), and the provision calling for de novo
review, id. § 706(2)(F), see 401 U.S. at 413-15, the Court set forth a three-tiered
standard of judicial review for informal administrative action. It stated that for the
Secretary's decision to be sustained under this standard, the reviewing court would be
required to decide (1) first, whether the Secretary had acted within the scope of his
authority, id. at 415; (2) if so, then whether the actual choice made was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law, id. at
416; and (3) finally, whether the Secretary's action followed the necessary procedural
requirements, id. at 417. After observing that, notwithstanding the existence of a full
administrative record upon which the Secretary had based his decision, the district court
had based its decision below on litigation affidavits which amounted to mere "post hoc"
rationalizations, id. at 419, the Court remanded the case to the district court for a
full hearing on that record.
95. 470 F.2d at 300. The court stated additionally "[ifn making the latter determination, the court must decide if the agency failed to consider all relevant factors
in reaching its decision, or if the decision itself represented a clear error in judgment."
Id.
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on the findings which it held must be met for a reviewing court to
sustain an administrator's decision to proceed with a project which has
been challenged under NEPA. Reflecting the Supreme Court's initial
concern with whether the action in question was within the administrator's scope of authority, the court stated that the reviewing court must
first determine if the agency reached its decision after a "full, good
faith consideration and balancing of environmental factors." 9 6 Turning next to the substance of the administrator's decision, the court
adapted to NEPA the second test of the Supreme Court's multiple
standard in Overton Park by holding that the reviewing court should
then determine, according to the standards set forth in sections 101(b)
and 102(1) of NEPA whether "the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight
to environmental values."97 The court then seemed to recognize implicitly that there was no question in the case before it of a limitation
on the Corps' statutory authority under NEPA to decide to proceed
with the project and moved directly to a review of the substance of
that decision by tersely stating: "In light of our holding, there is no
alternative but to subject the decision of the Corps . . . to review under the arbitrary and capricious standard."0g8 Finding a complete record before it, and observing that the project was authorized eleven
years prior to NEPA and was sixty-three percent complete, with previous, irretrievable expenditures approaching ten million dollars when
the suit was filed, the court ruled that .the Corps' decision to proceed
was neither arbitrary nor capricious and affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the case.
Slightly over a year later, the Eighth Circuit's opinion in EDF
v. Corps was followed by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sierra Club
v. Froehlke,99 another suit to enjoin a congressionally approved flood
control project. As in EDF v. Corps, the suit was based in part on
a claim that the Corps of Engineers' substantive decision to proceed
96. Id.
97. Id., quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
98. 470 F.2d at 300-01. This same assumption seems to have been made by the
court in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (dictum), which, while neither rejecting nor mentioning scope of
review, said simply that the arbitrary and capricious test is the proper standard for
review. It has been suggested that substantive review under NEPA should, as a general
rule, be limited to determining whether the substantive decision was arbitrary and capricious, since the limitations which NEPA places on agencies provide no basis for determining whether the substantive decision exceeded the agency's scope of authority. See 24
STAN. L. REv. 1117, 1132 (1972). But see Note, supra note 88, at 313-17.
99. 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973).
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with the project subsequent to the filing of an impact statement should
be overturned on its merits. 100 In initially holding that the agency's
decision was reviewable, the court noted that Congress had not prohibited judicial review under NEPA and that judicial review would
play a positive role in achieving the purposes of the Act. 101 Quoting
at length from the Eighth Circuit's opinion in EDF v. Corps, °2 the
court followed the bifurcated standard of review adopted in that decision and upheld the Corps' decision to iroceed by finding first that
it was reached after a full, good faith consideration of environmental
factors and second that it was neither arbitrary nor capricious.' 03
Thus, while some cases have seemingly continued to follow the
view that judicial review is limited to an examination of whether the
agency complied with procedural requirements of NEPA, 04 the ma100. See id. at 951.
101. Id. at 952. Judicial review serves the beneficial function of requiring that
agencies articulate their reasons and findings with care and precision, thus rationalizing
the decision-making process. See W. GELLHORN & C. BysE, ADMMSTITVE LAW
CASES AND Commais 111 (5th ed. 1970). Moreover, since the CEQ is without enforcement power, judicial review of agency determinations under NEPA is important
if merely perfunctory agency compliance is to be prevented. See note 13 supra for
a discussion of the advisory nature of CEQ Guidelines.
102. 486 F.2d at 952.
The court also noted that in an intervening case, Conservation Council v.
Froehlke, 473 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), the Fourth Circuit, in a brief
opinion, expressly adopted the Eighth Circuit's holding in EDF v. Corps when it held
that a district court could not discharge its obligation to review the merits of a substantive agency decision merely by determining that the agency had acted in a procedurally correct manner. 486 F.2d at 952.
103. In announcing the standard of review to be used in its decision, the Seventh
Circuit initially stated flatly that "ft]he review should be limited to determining
whether the agency's decision is arbitrary or capricious." Id. at 953. While this language might, at first glance, seem to indicate that the court was adopting a single standard of review rather than the dual standard followed by the Eighth Circuit in EDF
v. Corps, such an intent is belied by two factors. First, the court quoted and used
the dual standard in reaching its decision. Second, this narrow statement was followed
by a quotation from the Overton Park case that "[tihe court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency," quoting 401 U.S. at 416-a fact
strongly indicating that the court's true intent in making that statement was to indicate,
as the Supreme Court had done in the earlier portion of its Overton Park opinion (see
note 94 supra), the impropriety of a de novo standard of judicial review. This statement may retain additional significance, however, in that it may indicate on the part
of the Seventh Circuit an assumption similar to that possibly made by the Eighth Circuit in EDF v. Corps, see text accompanying note 98 supra, that the case presented
no question of the agency's statutory authority to make a decision as to whether to
proceed with the project, to be examined under the first step of the Overton Park and
EDFv. Corps tests.
104. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1973); Bradford Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 463 F.2d 537 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972); Citizens for Mass Transit Against Freeways
v. Brinegar, 357 F. Supp. 1269, 1275-76 (D. Ariz. 1973).
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jority view now appears to be that an agency's decision on the merits
is reviewable. 1

5

Furthermore, since rarely if ever will there arise a ques-

tion of an agency's statutory authority to make a decision as to whether
or not to proceed with a project after an impact statement has been

filed, 10 6 it appears that judicial review will focus upon the substance
of that decision and that the arbitrary and capricious
erally considered to be the appropriate standard of
view that NEPA creates substantive duties seems the
result considering the Act's express statutory directive

test is now genreview.10 7 The
only reasonable
to federal agen-

cies to work toward specific ecological goals.10 8 Moreover, since, ex-

105. See cases cited in note 110 infra.
106. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Conservation Council v. Froeblke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (dictum); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, - F. Supp.
-, - (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375, 1380 (W.D. Tenn.
1972).
Justice Douglas has argued for a broader standard of review. See Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
926, 931 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). If the impact statement could be considered
a record upon which the agency bases its action, then application of the stricter substantial evidence test of judicial review might be warranted. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E)
(1970).
Under the substantial evidence test an agency's findings would only be
upheld if supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. See L. JAFFE 595-96. While at least one court has utilized the
substantial evidence test, this seems to have been due to the fact that an adjudicatory
hearing required by another statute was held in conjunction with the statement's preparation. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972). In another case, although the issue was left open, the
arbitrary and capricious standard was deemed more appropriate than the broader substantial evidence test by a three-judge court that expressly considered the question.
See City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also
Note, supra note 88, at 317 n.17.
Two commentators have even gone so far as to contend that an agency's compliance with the substantive policies of section 101 should be reviewed by the courts as
a matter of law, with the courts deciding what constitutes an "essential consideration
of national policy." See Cohen & Warren, supra note 92, at 693-94.
108. The specific goals of the Act are set out in section 101 (b)(1)-(6), reprinted in
note 2 supra. As the court pointed out in EDF v. Corps, the procedural provisions of
section 102(2) are not ends in themselves, but rather a means of assuring that the policies
set forth in section 101 are implemented. See 470 F.2d at 297-98. The language
of sections 101 and 102 is not without substance, and while the national policy of
environmental protection outlined in section 101 is necessarily general and conditioned
by the recognition of "other essential considerations of national policy," the congressional intention to effect substantive changes in federal policy is made clear by section
102(1) in which:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible
. . the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
chapter. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) (emphasis added). For the full text
of this section see note 3 supra.
Thus NEPA requires compliance "to the fullest extent possible" with substantive poli-
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cept for a few narrowly construed exceptions, 109 there is a presumption
that administrative action is reviewable by the courts, the existence
of substantive duties under section 101 implies the existence of judicial review of agency compliance with those duties."10 Finally, it seems clear
that the courts in EDF v. Corps and Sierra Club v. FroehIke were
correct in adopting the arbitrary and capricious standard as indicated
by the Supreme Court in Overton Park for reviewing the substance
of the agency decisions before them. While even broader review of
agency compliance with the substantive provisions of NEPA has its
advocates,"' the scope of review contemplated by the arbitrary and
capricious test is of sufficient rigor to ensure that both environmental
and competing social values are protected while permitting the exercise of a reasonable degree of discretion by governmental officials.
DELEGATION OF IMPACT STATEMENT PREPARATION

Section 102(2) (C) of the Act requires a "detailed impact statement by the responsible official.""12 Several cases have addressed the
question of whether an agency may comply with this requirement by
delegating the preparation of impact statements to state agencies or
private parties and have reached conflicting results.
The leading case holding that an agency may not delegate its responsibility to prepare an impact statement is Greene County Planning
Board v. FPC."3 In Greene County, the Power Authority of the State
cies contained in section 101, as well as the operating procedures contained in section
102(2). See Cohen & Warren, supra note 92, at 692-93; Note, supra note 88, at 314.
109. Such an exception is found where Congress expressly precludes judicial review.
See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). Judicial review is also not available when agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law. Id. Both of these exceptions are narrowly
construed. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410
(1971). There is nothing in the language of NEPA or its legislative history to indicate a legislative desire to foreclose judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970);
S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The second exception applies only
when a statute is so broad that there is no "law to apply." 401 U.S. at 410. Since
the reordering of priorities and consideration of environmental values required by
NEPA limits the discretion of federal agencies, this suffices as the necessary "law to
apply." See National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.
1973); Note, supra note 88, at 308-10; Note, supra note 13, at 191.
110. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1973). The court
there stated: "Given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive requirements of
the Act, we believe that courts have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits." Id; accord, Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664
(4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs,
470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972).
111. See, e.g., Cohen & Warren, supra note 92, at 693-94 (courts should review substantive compliance as a matter of law).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970). For full text see note 3 supra.
113. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
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of New York (PASNY) sought authorization from the FPC to construct a high-voltage transmission line.

The FPC required PASNY

to prepare a draft impact statement, 114 but maintained that the FPC
itself need not prepare an impact statement until it filed its final decision."1r

The FPC found some support for its position in the CEQ

Guidelines, which permitted an agency to defer preparation of its own
draft statement until after it had conducted a hearing subject to the

APA and preceded by adequate public notice.': 6 The Second Circuit
rejected this interpretation of NEPA, saying that section "102(2) (C)
explicitly requires the agency's own detailed statement to 'accompany
the proposal through the existing agency review processes.' ""17 In
so holding, the court expressed a concern that the FPC was abdicating

a significant part of its responsibility by substituting the statement of
PASNY for its own and a fear that applicant-prepared impact state-

ments would likely be "based upon self-serving assumptions.""x 8
The Greene County analysis was recently followed in Conserva114. Id. at 422. The FPC's action was consistent with that agency's guidelines for
compliance with NEPA which requires that applicants for major power projects submit
a "detailed statement of environmental factors. . . ." 18 C.F.R. § 2.81(b) (1971).
115. 455 F.2d at 418-19.
116. CEQ Guidelines § 10(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7726 (1971). The current
guidelines abandon this position, presumably in response to the Greene County case.
See CEQ Guidelines § 1500.7, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,554 (1973). See note 148 infra for
the text of these guidelines.
117. 455 F.2d at 421 (emphasis in original). The court noted that the hearings
in PASNY's application undoubtedly constituted an "existing agency review process."
Id. at 422.
It would of course be permissible for an agency to hold a hearing prior to preparation of a draft statement if the sole purpose of the hearing was to collect data to
be included in such a statement, as opposed to a hearing on the merits of the proposal
as was involved in Greene County. Id. at 421 n.23; Brief for Petitioner Greene
County Planning Bd. at 24-25.
118. Id. at 420. A later district court case in the Second Circuit, involving delegation of impact statement preparation to a state highway department, interpreted Greene
County as allowing a draft, but not a final, statement to be prepared by the applicant.
See Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 741 (D. Conn. 1972).
If a draft statement is seen as a statement circulated for comment that is to be followed
by an agency-prepared statement which will accompany the proposal through all important steps of the agency review process such as public hearings under the APA, applicant-prepared draft statements would be consistent with Greene County. Current CEQ
Guidelines allow such a use of a draft statement for which the agency "takes responsibility." CEQ Guidelines § 1500.9, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,554 (1973). However, the court
in Greene County referred approvingly to the AEC rules, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,071 (1971),
which require a draft statement by both the applicant and its own staff. See 455 F.2d
at 422. It nonetheless remains that Greene County does make clear that an agencyprepared statement is required at some point before the agency conducts hearings which
are part of the agency review process.
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lion Society v. Secretary of Transportation,"9 a district court case in

the same circuit. In this case an impact statement on a proposed federally funded highway was prepared by the state highway department
pursuant to Department of Transportation (DOT) procedures that require state preparation with "review" and "adoption" by federal officials.' 2 ' Even though the impact statement was prepared by a state
agency rather than by a private party as in Greene, the court found
the same impermissible delegation and danger of a self-serving statement. 12'
Directly counter to the Second Circuit's view are several decisions
from courts in other circuits. 22

In National ForestPreservation Group

v. Volpe,' 23 a district court examined the issue of delegation of impact
statement preparation to a state highway department. The court, in
rejecting the Greene County rationale, relied heavily on CEQ and
congressional approval of the DOT procedure requiring delegation. 24
The court found no reason to interpret the statutory language requiring
a statement "by the responsible official" as mandating that the statement be prepared by the federal agency itself. The court also rejected
the Greene County court's concern over the danger of self-serving
statements, noting the dependence of the federal-aid highway program
on the close cooperation between state and federal agencies and the
119. 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973).
120. Under the DOT procedures, the state agency is made responsible for preparation of both the draft and final statement. DOT PPM 90-1, supra note 13.
121. The court refused to distinguish Greene County on the ground that it involved
a private party:
[1t is impossible for the Vermont Highway Department not to be an
advocate of legislatively mandated construction and still act consistently with
its duty as a state agency. This being true, delegation of the preparation of
an EIS to the VHD raises the danger that the EIS will reflect "self-serving
assumptions" and brings the case directly within Greene County. 362 F. Supp.
at 631.
The court considered immaterial the fact that the FHWA lacked the staff to prepare impact statements for the large number of federally-assisted highway projects. Id.
122. See, e.g., Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3584 (U.S. Apr. 15, 1974); Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ga. 1973); National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972).
123. 352 F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972).
124. The court noted that the chairman of the CEQ had expressly approved the
FHWA procedure in congressional hearings and that Congress had implicitly approved
the procedure by its subsequent enactment of section 436(b) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, 23 U.S.C. § 109 (1970). That section, which requires the Secretary
of Transportation to submit to Congress guidelines ensuring that possible adverse economic, social, and environmental effects of highway construction have been fully considered, 352 F. Supp. at 125-26, was enacted without changing the existing delegation
policy.
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absence of any presumption that state agencies are unconcerned with
environmental problems. 12 5 In the 1973 case of Citizens Environmental
Council v. Volpe,12 6 the Tenth Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning by rejecting in a brief statement the plaintiff's assertion that the
Secretary of Transportation had unlawfully delegated the preparation
of an impact statement to a state highway department: "The Secre-

tary of Transportation did not simply 'rubber stamp' the State's work.
He reviewed it and adopted it as his own. This procedure is consistent
127

with the goals of NEPA."'
Two 1973 circuit court cases have upheld impact statement preparation by a private party in one instance, and a state highway agency
in the other, where the responsible federal agency actively participated
in statement preparation. In Life of the Land v. Brinegar,128 the
Ninth Circuit considered the issue of delegation to a non-governmental
concern. Here preparation of an impact statement on a proposed airport runway project had been delegated to a private consulting firm
with a financial interest in an affirmative decision to proceed with the
project. The court found no improper delegation since NEPA does
not require subjective impartiality in statement preparation," 9 and because federal officials actively participated in all phases of the statement preparation process. 80 In Iowa Citizens for Environmental
Quality, Inc. v. Volpe,'

also discussed previously in connection with

impact statement sufficiency, the Eighth Circuit upheld a delegation
to the Iowa State Highway Commission. While the court distinguished

Greene County by finding "extensive participation,"'

2

by the Federal

125. 352 F. Supp. at 126-27. The court found nothing wrong with preparation by
applicant highway departments, "the most obvious and important source of information
and expertise." Id. at 126. In addition, the court noted that DOT PPM 90-1 provides
standards which insure an adequate impact statement. Id. at 127.
126. 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3584 (U.S. Apr. 15,
1974).
127. Id. at 873.
128. 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3595 (U.S. Apr. 22,
1974).
129. Id. at 467. The court relied on cases stating that compliance with section 102
requires only good faith objectivity not subjective impartiality. Id.; see Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 296 (8th Cir. cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1072 (1972).
130. 485 F.2d at 467.
131. 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973).
132. This participation appeared to consist of the FHWA recommending changes
in the draft statement and providing additional information. See id. at 854.
The "participation" exception to the Greene County rule has gained increasing support. One district court which first held that the impact statement must be prepared by
the federal agency, not the state agency, later modified its judgment to provide that the
impact statement may be prepared by state and local officials provided that the federal
agency participates in the statement's preparation. See Northside Tenants' Rights Co-
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in the preparation of the impact

statement before it, the court's reliance on cases rejecting the Greene

County rationale 133 indicates that the requisite "participation" will be
found quite easily.184
The plain language of NEPA seems to support the position of
the Second Circuit: NEPA requires a detailed statement by the "re-

sponsible official," not state agencies or private parties. But practical
considerations favor the view that preparation by those other than federal officials, under certain conditions, does not violate NEPA. Particularly in the area of federal funding of highways, where the FHWA

has not been given the resources'8 5 necessary to prepare the large
number of impact statements required, 1 6 some delegation would seem
warranted.

A compromise suggested by the cases allowing dele-

gation when the federal agency "participates" in the statement preparation would be to have federal officials direct the preparation process, letting the applicants bear the cost of gathering information, but
leaving in the federal officials the authority and responsibility to decide

what information is needed and to evaluate the information gathered.' 3 7

While various factors, such as the public or private nature

of the applicant 88 might influence the distribution of duties between

alition v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 244, 248 (E.D. Wis. 1972), modified, 3 ENVroNMENTAL
L. REP. 20,154 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 1973).
133. Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ga.
1973); National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont.
1972).
134. See 487 F.2d at 854. In reaching its decision, the Iowa Citizens court also
noted that the DOT procedures allowing delegation deserved "great deference." See
id. at 855. It should be noted, however, that in a vigorous dissent, Judge Lay stated
that the delegation violated both the letter and spirit of NEPA's impact statement provision which he found to require a detailed, independent investigation by the federal
agency. Id. at 855-58.
135. The district court in Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp.
627, (D.Vt. 1973), suggested that the FHWA was not adequately staffed to prepare the
large number of impact statements required by highway projects. See id. at 631.
136. Nearly half of the impact statements submitted to the CEQ have been on highway projects. See Talbott, Prospect '73, HIGHWAY USER 9 (Jan. 1973).
137. See ANDERSON, supra note 51, at 195. Another proposed solution is to allow
non-applicant state agencies, such as a state environmental agency, to prepare the impact statements required for projects, such as federally funded highways, within the
state. See Comment, The Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements by State
Highway Commissions, 58 IowA L. REv. 1268, 1272 n.32 (1973).
138. Arguably more responsibility in the preparation process could be delegated to
a state agency than to an interested private party. Cf. Natural Forest Preservation
Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123, 127 (D. Mont. 1972). However, one court that
has considered this possible distinction has concluded that delegation to a state highway
department is impermissible: "[Mt is impossible for the Vermont Highway Department
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the applicant and the federal agency in different situations, the great-

est emphasis should be placed upon fulfillment of the intended purposes of an impact statement.

Given proper standards with which the

applicant must comply, 13 9 the informational purpose of the requirement can be achieved by a delegated statement.

But in order to en-

sure actual consideration of environmental values by the federal
agency and to comply with the statutory requirement of a statement
"by the responsible official," the active federal role in statement prep-

aration suggested above should be required.
NEPA AND PUBLIC HEARINGS
While the CEQ Guidelines provide for public hearings "whenever appropriate,"14 0 the courts are unanimous in holding that NEPA
does not require hearings in every case. 4 ' Illustrative of this view
is a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit, JicarilaApache Tribe of
Indians v. Morton, 42 in which the plaintiffs challenged the lack of
public adversary hearings prior to issuance of final impact statements
on proposed construction of coal-fired electric generating facilities.
The court rejected the contention that meaningful public participation
required hearings in all cases, pointing to the lack of an express provinot to be an advocate of legislatively mandated construction and still act consistently
with its duty as a state agency." Conservation Soe'y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F.
Supp. 627, 631 (D. Vt., 1973). Similarly, one commentator has concluded that the "inherent bias" of state highway departments creates as much danger of self-serving assumptions in impact statements as statement preparation by private applicants. See
Comment, supra note 137, at 1276-82. But see National Forest Preservation Group
v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972).
139. See, e.g., DOT PPM 90-1, supra note 13. See also CEQ Guidelines § 1500.7
(c), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,553 (1973).
In most cases the presence of opponents whose views will be included in the statement will reduce the danger of incomplete or biased statements. Consequently, some
courts have held that statements must contain responsible opposing views. See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
cf. Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222, 226-27 (M.D.N.C. 1972), remanded, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973).
140. CEQ Guidelines § 10(e) (1971). The current guidelines provide that public
bearings be held "whenever appropriate" and list factors to be considered in making
this determination, including the size of the project, the degree of interest in the proposal, the complexity of the issue, the likelihood of the hearing providing useful information, and the extent of public involvement already achieved through other means.
CEQ Guidelines § 1500.7(d), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,553 (1973). The executive order implementing NEPA also provides that hearings be held "whenever appropriate." Exec.
Order No. 11514, 3 C.F.R. 285 (1973).
141. See, e.g., Lathan v. Volpe, -F.2d - (9th Cir. 1973); Citizens for Clean
Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 356 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
142. 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973).
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sion in NEPA -requiring hearings, and stated that the decision
whether or not to hold administrative hearings was within the realm
of the sound discretion of the Secretary of the Interior.143 The court
then held that in the case at hand there had been no showing that

hearings were so appropriate that failure to hold them constituted an
abuse of that discretion and a consequent failure to comply with the
1 44
requirements of NEPA.
Where hearings are required by applicable statutes other than
NEPA, the issue arises as to when, relative to the preparation of the
impact statement, those hearings should be conducted. Section
102(2)(C) provides that the impact statement and the comments
upon the proposal "shall accompany the proposal through the existing

agency review processes.

'145

In the Greene County case,' 40 the Sec-

ond Circuit held that, since licensing hearings constituted an "existing

agency review process,"' 47 the FPC violated section 102(2)(C) when
it conducted such hearings prior to its preparation of an impact statement even though this procedure was supported by the CEQ Guidelines. 148 A 1973 district court case, Harlem Valley TransportationAs143. Id. at 1284-86.
144. Id. at 1285. One court has indicated what it considered to be one set of circumstances in which failure to hold hearings will be held to constitute an abuse of
discretion:
In light of the large number of unresolved issues extant in this case, the
deep public concern expressed by those responding to the Department's draft
statement, the need for public enlightenment in areas involving the future
availability of natural resources such as this [helium], and the overriding national policy issue involved in this proposed action, the Court is convinced
that the Department's failure to hold public hearings did constitute an abuse
of discretion. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78, 107 (D.
Kan.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), petition for
cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1974) (No. 73-1120).
In some cases, public hearings might be necessary before an agency could issue
a negative statement. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 835-36 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). See note 21 supra.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970). For text of this provision see note 5 supra.
146. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). See notes 11239 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's holding on the validity
of a federal agency's delegating preparation of an impact statement which it is required
to file under NEPA.
147. Id. at 421-22. The court described the issue involved as follows:
The parties . . . are in vigorous disagreement over when the Commission
must make its impact statement. The Commission argues that PASNY's
statement, reviewed as to form by the Commission and circulated by it, suffices for the purposes of Section 102(2)(C) and that the Commission is not
required to make its own statement until it files its final decision. Petitioners
argue that the Commission must issue its statement prior to any formal hearings. PASNY. . . proposes a third course of action. It urges that the Commission can draft its statement on the basis of the hearings, but to be circulated by it for comment before its final decision. It is clear to us that petitioners offer the correct interpretation. Id. at 418-19.
148. The FPC relied on section 10(e) of the Guidelines which provided:
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sociation v. Stafford,14 9 followed Greene County by holding that a draft
statement is required before the ICC conducts mandatory hearings in

railroad abandonment proceedings.'50
A different issue involving the relative timing of hearings and

impact statement preparation was raised in Citizens for Clean Air, Inc.
v. Corps of Engineers,'5 ' another 1973 district court decision. In that
case the court rejected the contention that the Corps of Engineers was

required to hold hearings prior to filing a final impact statement. Instead, the court held that even if the Corps' regulation required man-

datory public hearings, there was neither a statutory nor a due process
rationale for requiring that the hearings be held before the filing of
the final impact statement rather than after -the filing and during the
2
process of agency review.15

Agencies which hold hearings on proposed administrative actions or legislation should make the draft environmental statement available to the public
at least fifteen (15) days prior to the time of the relevant hearings except
where the agency prepares the draft statement on the basis of a hearing subject to the Administrative Procedure Act and preceded by adequate public notice and information to identify the issues and obtain the comments provided
for in sections 6-9 of these guidelines. 36 Fed. Reg. 7726 (1971).
The current guidelines abandon this position and provide that draft statements
should be issued at least fifteen days prior to those hearings utilized as part of the
normal agency review process. CEQ Guidelines § 1500.7(d), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,553
(1973).
149. 360 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
150. Id. at 1065-66; accord, City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (three-judge panel). But cf. Monroe County Conservation Council,
Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972). After holding that 23 U.S.C. § 128 required a public hearing on a proposed highway project the court in the Monroe County
case stated: "Such a hearing will in any event be most valuable in aiding the agency
in its preparation of the impact statement which we have today held is required by
NEPA." Id. at 702.
In a recent case involving hearings on a proposed highway required by 23 U.S.C.
§ 128(a), the Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to expressly decide the issue:
[W]e need not consider whether section 128(a) or NEPA require that the
draft environmental impact statement be made available to the public before
the hearing is held. Current FHWA procedures, which will apply to the new
hearings, assure that this will be done. Lathan v. Volpe, -F.2d-,-(9th
Cir. 1973).
151. 356 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The controversy involved issuance by the
Corps of a permit for construction of a power plant by a public utility.
152. Id. at 20, see Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275,
1286 (9th Cir. 1973). Current CEQ Guidelines assume that if hearings are held, they
will be held after the draft statement is issued, but before the final statement is filed.
See CEQ Guidelines § 1500.7(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,552 (1973). The sequence of draft
statement-hearing-final statement is clearly preferable to the issuance of the final statement before a hearing because interposition of the public hearings between the draft
and final statements should tend to increase the comprehensiveness of the final statements.
In reaching its decision in Citizens for Clean Air, the court noted that NEPA requires only a final statement. 356 F. Supp. at 20. Moreover, as originally issued, the
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The problem of the relative timing of hearings and impact statement preparation is part of a larger question: at what point in the
agency decision-making process must an impact statement be prepared?

The only answer consistent with the spirit of NEPA is that

an impact statement must be prepared at the earliest possible time,
before an agency becomes committed to a proposal and the impact
statement begins to serve as a justification for decisions already
made. 158 Although the language of section 102(2)(C) envisions only
one statement, prepared after comments on the proposal have been
received and to accompany the proposal through the existing agency
CEQ Guidelines seemed to indicate that the "review process" ended with the final impact statement. Those guidelines required the statement to contain:
Where appropriate, discussion of problems and objectives raised by other
Federal, State, and local agencies and by private organizations and individuals
in the review process and the disposition of the issues involved. (This section may be added at the end of the review process in the final text of the
environmental statement.) CEQ Guidelines § 6(vii) (1971) (emphasis
added).
The current guidelines contemplate a similar scheme in which a draft statement
is circulated for comment at the beginning of the agency review process and then a
final statement is made available to the President, the CEQ, and the public toward
the end of the review process. See CEQ Guidelines § 1500.2, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550.
§ 1500.7, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,552, 9H 1500.9-.11, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,554-56 (1973). Apparently recognizing the conflict between this process and section 102(2) (C) which requires
that the final statement (i.e., the statement made after comments on the proposal
are obtained) accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes,
the current guidelines provide:
In all cases, agencies should allot a sufficient review period for the final statement so as to comply with the statutory requirement that the "statement and
the comments and views of appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies...
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes." Id.
§ 1500.11(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,556 (1973).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970), note 5 supra.
153. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420-22 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). See also CEQ Guidelines § 1500.2, 38 Fed. Reg.
20,550, § 1500.7, 38 Fed. Reg 20,552 (1973), which elaborate on this necessity for
providing an impact statement at the earliest possible time:
It is important that draft environmental statements be prepared and circulated
for comment and furnished to the Council as early as possible in the agency
review process in order to permit agency decisionmakers and outside reviewers
to give meaningful consideration to the environmental issues involved. In
particular, agencies should keep in mind that such statements are to serve as
the means of assessing the environmental impact of proposed agency actions,
rather than as a justification for decisions already made. This means that
draft statements on administrative actions should be prepared and circulated
for comment prior to the first significant point of decision in the agency review process Id. § 1500.7(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,552 (1973).
A 1972 report by the GAO found that many federal agencies were making decisions that might have important environmental consequences before impact statements
were available. See COMPTROLLER GENEPAL, supra note 47, at 13-20. This report
concluded that:
The Federal agencies' environmental impact statements would be more
useful in the decisionmaking process if the completed statements for a proposal were available at all organizational review levels of a proposal and at
the earliest stages of decisionmaking. Id. at 19.
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review process, the practice of using a thorough draft statement"5 for
this purpose clearly satisfies the statutory purpose of ensuring that en-

vironmental factors are considered at every important step in the decision-making process.'

55

And while requiring preparation of a draft

statement prior to agency hearings held early in the agency's decision-

making process imposes a burden on the agencies,15 6 it must be remembered that the often burdensome procedural duties imposed by NEPA
57
are a critical part of the statutory scheme.'
CONCLUSION

After three years of interpretation by the courts, the case law
construing the "opaque"' 58 language of NEPA is in conflict in sev-

eral important areas.

Courts have disagreed on the issue of what con-

stitutes a significant adverse environmental impact requiring the filing

of an environmental impact statement and on the related question of
a proper standard of review of an agency's "negative determination"
that a proposed action does not require a filing; on the proper test of

an impact statement's sufficiency; and on the standard of judicial review which should be applied by the courts in examining an agency's
154. The guidelines of the CEQ .require that the draft statement fulfill to the fullest
extent possible at the time the draft is prepared the requirements established for final
statements by section 102(2)(C). CEQ Guidelines § 1500.7(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,552
(1973).
155. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC,
449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
156. The ICC has been particularly concerned that it would have to assign a staff
of employees to the task of preparing impact statements, "an assignment for which
there are no budgeted funds and no authorized increase in personnel." See Harlem
Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In addition to objecting to the time and expense of statement preparation, the General Counsel
of the ICC has stated that the "burdensome and prolonged litigation" that will result
from cases holding that the ICC must prepare draft statements prior to railroad abandonment hearings will seriously impair the Commission's efforts to create an economically sound and efficient railroad system in the Northeast. Remarks by Fritz Kahn,
supra note 8, at 19-20. The possibility of the application of the impact statement
requirement to the far greater number of motor carrier applications proceedings was
even more frightening to Mr. Kahn. Id. at 23-24. Mr. Kahn's fears seem to be wellfounded. See Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. United States, 6 BNA ENV. REP.
1129 (D. Del., Dec. 19, 1973) (order streamlining certification procedures for motor
carriers transporting waste products requires impact statement).
157. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 422-23 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC,
449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
158. City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(three-judge court).
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decision to proceed with a project once an impact statement has been
filed. There also remains disagreement on the validity of an agency's
delegating impact statement preparation to a state agency or a private
party and on the issue of the proper timing of impact statement preparation within the agency review process.
Because of the vagueness of the language of this "new and unusual"' 5 9 statute the courts have the difficult task of attempting to
reconcile the public interest in a healthy environment with a similar
public interest in administrative efficency and the accomplishment of
the central tasks of the various agencies. While NEPA was intended
to give a high priority to environmental protection,' 1 it does not make
it the overriding goal of federal agencies. Thus, the courts have been
confronted with the difficult 'burden of ensuring that the purposes of
NEPA are advanced while at the same time preventing parties from
indiscriminately utilizing NEPA to disrupt and delay important administrative programs.' 6' In some areas, serving the statutory purposes
will require holding sometimes recalcitrant agencies to a high standard, as by a broad judicial interpretation of the statutory language to
encourage the preparation of impact statements and by enforcement
of the requirement that impact statements be prepared at the beginning of the agency review process. In other areas reasonable compromises can be made that will accomplish the purposes of the Act while
recognizing practical limits to its enforcement, as on the questions of
delegations of statement preparation and the required contents of impact statements. While wise judicial interpretation and good faith
agency attempts at compliance can help resolve some of the problems
arising under NEPA, legislative clarification of the vague and ambig.
uous statutory language would also seem to be needed to ensure that the
final resolution of these competing considerations will be consistent with
the congressional intent which underlay the enactment of NEPA.
159. Id. at 164.
160. The high priority given environmental protection is indirectly reflected in the
statutory language that refers to "other essential considerations of national policy," see
§ 101(b) set out in note 2 supra, and in the legislative history of the Act in which
its sponsor in the Senate referred to "a standard of excellence in man's relationships
to his physical surroundings." 115 CoNG. Rac. 19,009 (1969) (remarks of Senator
Jackson).
161. See Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
42 U.S.L.W. 3595 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark.), affd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972).

